Nuclear encyclopedia

Chapters / Treaties and arms control

Treaties and arms control

NPT, the test bans, SALT and START, INF, New START and the TPNW: the paper architecture holding the nuclear order together.

Status: the post-New-START register, current to November 2026. Release v0.8.1, 20 November 2026. Bracketed [source-id] links point to the source register.

The nuclear age is governed by a layered web of treaties, most of them under strain. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty is the load-bearing wall: 191 parties, a bargain of non-proliferation for disarmament and peaceful use, and four states forever outside it. [unoda-npt]

Bilateral US-Russia arms control, which cut the great arsenals by more than 80 per cent from their peak, ended its last rung on 5 February 2026, when New START expired without a successor. For the first time since 1972 there is no treaty limit on the two largest arsenals. This chapter keeps the register of what exists, what collapsed, and what was never signed. [aca-newstart] [npr-newstart]

NPT: the load-bearing wall

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. It rests on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful nuclear energy. With 191 states parties it is the most widely adhered-to disarmament agreement; India, Pakistan and Israel never joined, and North Korea withdrew in 2003. The Eleventh Review Conference met in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2026, the third straight cycle (after 2015 and 2022) negotiating against a record of failed consensus documents. [unoda-npt]

The test bans

The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty ended atmospheric, underwater and space testing for its parties, after 528 atmospheric detonations. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty completed the prohibition on paper but has never entered into force: nine Annex-2 states (including the US, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea) have not ratified, and Russia de-ratified in 2023. The norm nonetheless holds: the CTBTO counts North Korea's 3 September 2017 test as the last anywhere, and January 2026 marked the longest test-free stretch since 1945. [aca-testing] [ctbto-ending]

The bilateral ladder, rung by rung

SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979, never ratified) froze and then capped launcher numbers; START I (1991) made the first deep cuts; the INF Treaty (1987) eliminated an entire class of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles before collapsing in August 2019 amid mutual violation charges. New START (2010, in force 5 February 2011) capped each side at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on 700 deployed delivery vehicles, with 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers; each heavy bomber counted as one warhead whatever it carried, a rule that made treaty totals read lower than independent estimates. The treaty was extended in 2021 to 5 February 2026, its last possible day. [statedept-newstart] [aca-newstart]

It expired on that date with no successor. At a Security Council meeting on 22 September 2025 President Putin had offered to keep observing the treaty's central quantitative limits for one year after expiry, provided the US acted "in a similar spirit"; the US administration declined, saying it wanted a "new, improved and modernized" treaty instead. On 11 February 2026 Foreign Minister Lavrov said Russia would continue observing the limits as long as the United States did and was in "no hurry" to exceed them: an informal, unverifiable standstill replacing a verified treaty. [kremlin-newstart-2025] [npr-newstart] [reuters-newstart-feb2026]

TPNW: the ban treaty

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by 122 states on 7 July 2017 and in force since 22 January 2021, is the first treaty to ban nuclear weapons outright: use, threat of use, development, possession, testing, stationing and transfer. As of October 2026 it has 75 states parties and 25 further signatories, Tonga's accession on 7 July 2026 making it the 100th country to take formal action. No nuclear-armed state, and no NATO member, has joined. [ican-tpnw]

Safeguards: the verification layer

Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states place their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards: accountancy, inspections and, for states with an Additional Protocol in force, wider access and information. The hard cases define the regime's limits: North Korea expelled inspectors and left the NPT; Iran's programme has run through cycles of restriction and breakout since the 2015 JCPOA unravelled. A dedicated safeguards section with the inspection mechanics at policy level is planned.

Still to come in this chapter

  1. Regional regimes: Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and the nuclear-weapon-free zones
  2. Safeguards mechanics: how the IAEA verifies, at policy level, with the Iran and DPRK case files
  3. The FMCT and other treaties that were never concluded
  4. What replaces New START: the negotiating options on the table after February 2026

Claims in the final text will carry citations to the source register; anything unverifiable will land on the gaps page instead.